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Modem philosophers such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, 
1 
Nietzsche, and Heidegger fundamentally transformed Western thought, which 
prepared the way for the contemporary embrace of value relativism. Unlike the 
classical philosophers of the past, such as Plato and Aristotle, who believed in 
objective moral truth and sought to answer the fundamental questions of mankind, 
many contemporary thinkers have dismissed objective moral truth and have embraced 
the idea that those things that cannot be proven empirically hold no validity 
whatsoever because they are merely subjective value judgments, relative to an 
individual's opinions or feelings, culture, or history. The rejection of the posfibility 
' 
of objective moral truth has undermined the core principles that are the· very 
foundation of Western culture. As the philosophical debate over the fundameqtal 
questions has withered, value relativism has come to be widely accepted; ultirrjately, 
this has caused a decline in morality in the West, as well as a loss of identity arid 
purpose. 
The problem with value relativism is that it holds that there are no univ¢rsally 
true answers to the great questions of mankind and that there is no natural order to the 
world that can be discovered by human reason to provide a model for human 
existence. The idea that there is no good, no evil, no noble, no base, no virtue, no 
justice, and ultimately, no truth about anything that is fundamentally important has 
led to the decline of Western Civilization. Relativism robs people of any real sense of 
purpose in life: if there is no truth in the world outside of science because all values 
are relative and all opinions are equal, what aspiration can human beings have7 If life 
has no real meaning, no real purpose, and no real direction, then what is the point? 
The alternative to value relativism is that answers to life's fundamental 
questions arise from inductive reasoning with conclusions based on relevant evidence 
and experience. Moral judgments are not merely subjective, unconnected to facts, or 
irrational, but are important things about which knowledge can be gained. The. wide 
acceptance of relativism has caused the Western philosophical spirit to evaporate. 
The ancient philosophers believed that, although extremely difficult, true kno'"'.ledge 
of the fundamental questions of mankind is attainable. What is most important, is not 
I 
complete knowledge of the absolute standards of right and wrong, but rather 
knowledge of what the fundamental questions are- which ones they are and why they 
are fundamental , for it is the pursuit of answers to these questions that has been part 
of the essential character of the West. The West once believed in certain values and 
principles, and these things acted to give the West its identity, its purpose, and its 
direction. As the core principles of the West degenerate, Westerners no longer know 
who they are or what they should fight for which acts to undermine the preservation 
of the West. If America and the West in general, do not find a way to repeal the 
negative effects that value relativism has caused and reassert its founding values and 
guiding principles, it will be extremely difficult to stop the West from declining into 
the abyss. 
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The Decline of the West 
Erosion of Western Identity 
The majority of people believe that the West has been, and still is to this day, 
progressing and advancing. From the violent monarchies of the past, liberal 
democracy has prevailed and with it, freedom, enlightenment, and human rights have 
flourished. Racism, slavery, and religious oppression have been replaced with 
multiculturalism, diversity, tolerance, acceptance, and openness of all sorts. Yet 
others believe that Western civilization has been and is still to this day in a state of 
decline. Many argue that something is fundamentally wrong in the West. 
The problem with the West is that it now has great difficulty recognizing what 
it values. Many could go as far as suggesting that the West no longer values anything, 
or at a minimum, does not believe in anything of intrinsic value that can be defended 
rationally upon indisputable principles. If Western values are no longer authoritative 
for us, then what is important to the West? As Samuel Huntington argues, the 
identity of the West, and in particular, the American national identity, has eroded 
(Huntington 2005, 6). The American people who achieved independence in the late 
eighteenth century shared a co=on culture and were co=itted to the principles in 
the Declaration oflndependence, the Constitution, and other founding documents. 
Key elements of that culture included the English language, Christianity, religious 
I 
co=itrnent, English concepts of the rule of law, the responsibility of rulers, tlie 
1 
rights of individuals, and a strong work ethic. America's national identity was,based 
' 
on arts, literature, music, language, morality, religious beliefs, social and political 
' I 
values, and assumptions as to what is right and wrong, which were deeply rootFd in 
the Anglo-Protestant culture (Huntington, 2005, 14). 
The settlers and Founding Fathers created the American creed with its : 
principles ofliberty, equality, democracy, representative government, private · 
property, and human rights (Huntington 2005, 41). The Anglo-Protestant culture of 
the settlers survived for 300 years as the paramount defining element of American 
identity. When there was a massive influx of immigrants from Europe in the early 
twentieth century, these immigrants assimilated into the American creed and identity. 
They adopted the American way oflife and embraced the American dream that 
through hard work and determination, they could succeed. 
In Federalist #2, John Jay, one of the Founding Fathers, argued that cohesion 
! 
of the American people was vital for the survival of the regime they had create~ 
(Rossiter 2003, 31). It strengthened the nation to have a united people, sharing the 
same values, the same ancestry, the same beliefs, the same customs, and the s~e 
religion. However, since World War II, the cohesion of the American people, along 
I 
with the American creed and identity, has been in decline. The celebration of 
diversity has replaced the emphasis on what Americans had in common (Huntjngton 
2005, 47). In the late twentieth century, multiculturalists and spokesmen for ethnic 
and racial minorities said Americanization was a form ofrepression. In the 60ls and 
! 
70's the primacy of national identity came under attack. Massive new numbers of 
2 
immigrants were able to maintain close ties with their country of origin, sustaining 
dual loyalties, dual nationalities, and often dual citizenship. Subnational racial, 
ethnic, gender, and cultural identities took on new importance. Immigrants no longer 
became "Americanized," they no longer assimilated into the American way oflife to 
the degree they had before. Americans were once one nation of individuals with 
equal rights, who shared the Anglo-Protestant core culture, and were dedicated ;to the 
liberal-democratic principles of the American creed. However, in the 60' s, powerful 
movements began to challenge the salience of American identity. America was no 
longer seen as a nation of individuals who share a common culture, but rather as a 
conglomerate of different races and ethnicities. Group membership began to become 
more important than a shared national identity. Ultimately, Huntington argued that 
multiculturalism replaced the unity that made America so strong (Huntington 2005, 
59). He argued that by strengthening racial and ethnic identities, America's cultural 
and creedal identity was weakened. He argued that multiculturalism in essence is 
opposed to the monocultural hegemony of Eurocentric values; it is in complete 
opposition to the Eurocentric concept of American democratic principles, culture, and 
identity. Huntington goes as far as to say that it is "nothing more than an anti-
Western ideology" (Huntington 2005, 59). Extreme multiculturalism is a direct 
result of the West's overall rejection of objective moral truth and its overwhelming 
embrace of value relativism, especially cultural relativism. Cultural relativists argue 
that because values are a product of one's particular culture, the West has no right to 
3 
impose its cultural values onto another culture and instead, the West should be 
accepting and tolerant of the values of all cultures. 
' Multiculturalists advance several propositions. They argue that Americ11 is 
composed of many different ethnic and racial groups, that each has its own culture, 
and that the white Anglo culture has suppressed these cultures for far too long 
(Huntington 2005, 61). They argue that it is the duty of government and privat\: 
institutions to liberate minorities. They argue that a critical factor in promoting 
multiculturalism is the classroom: instead of focusing on primarily Western history, 
schools should take a multicultural approach to education. Furthermore, they believe 
that by transforming the West into a multicultural entity, it will act to bring the world 
together. 
In addition, extensive international involvements of American business, 
academic, professional, media, nonprofit, and political elites lowered the salience of 
national identity (Huntington 2005, 143). Such entities began to define themselves, 
their interests, and their identities in terms of transnational and global institutions, 
networks, and causes. Globalization involved a huge expansion in the international 
interactions among individuals, corporations, governments, and nongovernmental 
organizations. Because of this, intellectual, political, and economic elites no longer 
embraced nationalism, but rather transnational identity. They began seeing 
themselves as "global citizens," or citizens of the world. The global involvements of 
the transnational economic elites erode their sense of belonging to a national 
4 
community. Prominent intellectuals and scholars have attacked nationalism, warned 
I 
' of the dangers of inculcating national pride and patriotism, and argued that national 
I 
identity is undesirable in today's multicultural world. This is in complete oppo1sition 
to the elites of the early twentieth century who sought to unify America. For , 
example, large corporations, such as Ford, helped to assimilate and "Americanize" 
immigrants and helped them to fit into the American way oflife (Huntington 2005, 
160). 
The end of the Cold War, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the end of 
communism left America with no enemy for the first time in its history and with no 
clear "other" against which to define itself (Huntington 2005, 257). This has had 
drastic consequences for American identity: a foggy sense of national interests, a 
decreasing willingness to sacrifice for one's country, a dwindling trust in government, 
and a softening of moral commitment. In the absence of an external enemy, 
individual self-interest trumps national commitment. Huntington argued that this is 
what caused the Roman republic to collapse into caesarism. When a nation's enemy 
is vanquished and it no longer poses a threat to the nation's very existence, a nation's 
sense of identity can be lost (Huntington 2005, 260). 
According to Huntington, Americans must recommit themselves to the Anglo-
Protestant culture, traditions, and values that for three and a half centuries have been 
embraced by Americans of all races, ethnicities, and religions and that have been the 
source of their liberty, unity, power, prosperity, and moral leadership. The rejection 
5 
of the American identity in favor of relativistic multiculturalism and diversity f?r its 
own sake, acts to keep us apart, which ultimately makes America weaker. 
With the exception of the Western world, people are turning to religion for 
comfort, guidance, solace, and identity (Huntington 2005, 81). However, in the 
West, religion has played a decreasing role in public, social, and private life. In June 
2002, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco 
decided 2-1 that the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance were a violation 
of separation of church and state. This sparked vigorous controversy on an issue 
central to America's identity. Supporters said that the U.S. is a secular country and 
that the First Amendment prohibited government support of religion. Critics said the 
phrase was consonant with the views of the framers of the Constitution. The Court's 
decision sharply posed the issue of whether America is a secular or religious na,tion. 
Today, Americans are still a highly religious people even though there has been a 
decline in church attendance over the last few decades. In 2003, 92% of Americans 
said they believed in God (Huntington 2005, 83). This is not the case in Europe. 
Christianity, which is central to Western culture, has been steadily declining in 
Europe. This has had significant consequences for the West, specifically, when 
talking about the rise of radical Islam and terrorism in the world. The real and 
potential enemies of the West are religiously driven. In all parts of the world, ~xcept 
· in Western Europe, there has been a resurgence of faith. The twenty-first century is 
beginning as an age of religion, which will increase religious conflicts around tpe 
world. Radical Islamic organizations believe they are fighting a holy war against 
6 
Jews and Christians. However, apart from America, the West no longer has the 
stomach for this type of conflict in part perhaps because it has lost its Christian faith. 
I 
It is impossible for the West to fight a war of this magnitude if its people no longer 
' 
embrace the very ideas that form the foundation of their being (Huntington 2oqs, 
100). 
Furthermore, the rejection of religion has caused a decline in morality and 
standards in the West (Huntington 2005, 96). The rejection of religion in the West 
has certainly led to moral decay. The tolerance of sexual behavior previously 
considered unacceptable, teenage pregnancy, single-parent families, increasing 
divorce rates, high levels of crime, drug abuse, pornography, and violence in the 
media are all things that point to moral decay. In addition, the rise of people living on 
welfare is also evidence of the rejection of the Anglo-Protestant culture that embraced 
a strong work ethic. It promoted the idea that through hard work and self reliance, 
people will be rewarded (Steyn 2008, 100). However, the West has become a 
socialized culture. Evidence suggests that America is turning away from the 
capitalistic system and, more than ever, is becoming increasingly open to European 
socialism. 
America, and the West as a whole, was once a place that believed in mo'ral 
objectivity. It was guided by values and moral principles that were held to be 
rationally defensible. However, through value relativism and the rejection of 
objective moral truth, the West no longer embraces the very things that make us 
Western in the first place. Ultimately, the West has lost its identity. 
7 
know what it means to be Western. When the people of the West no longer kn9w 
I 
who they are or what they believe in, this acts to undermine the preservation ofjthe 
West and acts to strengthen the enemies of the West. Enemies of the West are hot 
confused about who they are or what they believe in. They believe so strongly ,in 
their views that they will sacrifice their lives to promote them. But because the: West 
i 
no longer knows what it believes in, or possibly, because it no longer believes ih 
anything, it cannot adequately defend itself from those that wish to destroy it. If 
people no longer know what they believe in, or do not believe in anything, they will 
not fight for anything. This is exactly why Western identity must be restored. If the 
West has any hope of surviving, it must rediscover and embrace the very things that 
make it Western in the first place. As Huntington argues, if the West rediscovers. its 
identity and there is a unification of the people, only then does the West have a 
chance to survive (Huntington 2005, 248). 
Western Dominance Fading 
Cultural identity is important and meaningful for people. Huntington argues 
that cultural identities are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and 
conflict in the post-Cold War world (Huntington 2003, 20). He believes that the 
clashing of civilizations has now become the greatest threat to world peace. Since the 
Cold War, the most important distinctions among people were no longer ideological, 
' 
political, or economic, as was the case before, but became cultural. People begitn to 
8 
define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, cust9ms, 
' 
and institutions. 
I 
For over 400 years, the nation states of the West- Britain, France, Spaijl, 
Austria, Prussia, Germany, the U.S., and others constituted a multipolar internarional 
system within Western civilization that interacted, competed, and fought wars with 
each other (Huntington 2003, 21). At the same time, Western nations expanded, 
conquered, colonized, and decisively influenced every other civilization. Through its 
superior weaponry and tactics, the West was able to spread its ideas, values, and 
religious beliefs. However, as Huntington argues, this did not create a universal 
Westernization of the globe. There was not a cultural coming together of values, 
beliefs, practices, institutions, etc. by peoples throughout the world. 
Popular culture of the West has certainly been spread to other civilizations, 
but the world has not become universally Western (Huntington 2003, 41). People of 
other cultures may now wear jeans, drink Pepsi, and listen to rap music, but they are 
still distinct civilizations with different beliefs. It is inaccurate to assume that just 
because non-Westerners buy and consume Western goods that this is making them 
Westernized. Because the central elements of any culture or civilization are rooted in 
its religious beliefs, if the world has become universally Western, then it must be true 
that the World has embraced a universal religion. However, this is certainly not the 
case at all. It is not Christianity that has increased in the world; it is Islam that has 
grown. 
9 
• The idea that increased interaction among peoples through trade, investment, 
' tourism, media, and electronic communication has created a common world culture is 
' 
wrong (Huntington 2003, 58). Huntington argues that increased interaction Jong 
I 
cultures has actually promoted tension, not peace. Modernization has not led to a 
Western universal civilization. Instead, he argued that modernization, in places such 
as the Muslim world, has caused further rejection of Western culture. The MusHm 
' 
world feels increasingly threatened by the West and seeks to reassert and strengthen 
its own culture. Although the Muslim world has for the most part rejected 
modernization, other non-Western cultures, such as those in Asia, have embraced 
modernization (Huntington 2003, 59). However, modernization in Asia has not 
caused Asians to lose their cultural identities; modernization has actually acted to 
strengthen them. Through the global economy, Asia is strengthening its economic 
and military position in the world and can now better promote its own cultural beliefs 
i 
while rejecting Western culture. As Asia exemplifies, modernization does not mean 
Westernization. Non-Westerners have been able to modernize without abandoning 
their own cultural credence. Ultimately, modernization has strengthened non-
Western cultures, and so has reduced the power of the West comparatively. Although 
the world is becoming more modem, it has also become less Western. 
The overwhelming dominance of the West has been declining. The West's 
I 
share of political, economic, and military power is going down relative to that 9f 
other civilizations. Slow economic growth after the Cold War, stagnating 
I 
populations, unemployment, huge government deficits, declining work ethic, low 
savings rates, and social disintegration all point to the West's decline (Huntington 
2003, 83). Economic power is rapidly shifting to East Asia, and military and political 
power is starting to follow. India is on the verge of economic takeoff, and the Islamic 
world is growing increasingly hostile to the West. It seems that the world is fed up 
with Western dominance. Furthermore, the West's self-confidence and will to 
dominate is fading rapidly. China will likely emerge to challenge the West for ~lobal 
influence. 
At the peak of its territorial expansion in 1920, the West directly ruled about 
half of the Earth (Huntington 2003, 85). By 1993, this territorial control was cut in 
half. Minus the settler-populated lands in North America, Australia, and New 
Zealand, the West is back to its original European core. In contrast, the territory of 
independent Islamic societies rose from 1.8 million square miles in 1920, to over 11 
million square miles in 1993. Westerners now constitute a steadily decreasing 
minority of the world's population. In addition, the Western share of the global 
economic product peaked in the 1920's and has been declining since World War II. 
In contrast, East Asia has been undergoing an economic boom. Furthermore, in the 
1920's, the West's military capability was staggering. The West ruled quantitatively 
in terms of manpower, weapons, equipment, and resources; it ruled technologically in 
terms of having the most sophisticated weaponry; it ruled organizationally in terms of 
having the most highly skilled soldiers; and it ruled societally in terms. of the ability 
and willingness of a society to apply military force effectively for things that it 
11 
believes in. Now, in all four dimensions, the West has been declining. However, 
non-Western civilizations, like East Asia, have greatly improved their military , 
capabilities in all dimensions. 
Huntington argues that the West will remain the most p.owerful civilization 
I 
well into the early decades of the twenty-first century but that the age of Western 
dominance is coming to an end. The reason behind this is that there is growing:power 
of non-Western civilizations and a revival of cultures throughout the world. As non-
Western societies enhance their economic, military, and political capacity, they,will 
trumpet the virtues of their own values, institutions, and culture. As Western power 
declines, the ability of the West to impose Western ideas on the world will decline. 
Asia's economic growth along with Islam's population growth both pose an 
immense threat to Western sustainability (Huntington 2003, 90). Asia is likely to 
have seven of the ten largest economies by 2020, or about 40% of global econoinic 
I 
product. Wealth has long been as indicator for moral and cultural superiority. Asians 
no longer want to imitate the West, but want to express their own cultures. They have 
a desire to return to their cultural roots and authenticity. Asians view the West ~s 
being self-indulgent and individualistic; they see the West's high crime rate, inferior 
education, and disrespect for authority as symptoms of its moral decline. They 
believe that their cultural values of order, discipline, hard work, and collectivislp, are 
far superior to the values that the West now embraces (Huntington 2003, 93). 
12 
While Asians became increasingly assertive as a result of economic 
development, Muslims have always turned to Islam as a source of identity, me!fuing, 
! 
stability, legitimacy, development, power, and hope. The Muslim world believ~s that 
' 
Islam is the solution to Western decadence (Huntington 2003, 96). The Muslim 
I 
world, with its overpopulation and high fertility rates, poses a significant threat Ito the 
West and its low fertility rates. The youth provide recruits for radical Islamic 
organizations and political movements. They, above all, want to be a part of 
something that they feel is important and vital for the survival of their culture. They 
see the West declining in power, morality, and prestige and seek to do anything to 
reassert their own cultural beliefs while rejecting those of the West. So according to 
Huntington, with the rise of the Asian economy, and the rise oflslam, there will be a 
resurgence of non-Western power and culture and the clash of the peoples of non-
Western civilizations with the West and with each other (Huntington 2003, 97). 
Huntington argues that global politics is being reconfigured along cultural 
lines. Peoples and countries with similar cultures are coming together, while peoples 
and countries with different cultures are coming apart (Huntington 2003, 156). 
Alignments defined by ideology and superpower relations are giving way to 
alignments defined by culture and civilization. During the Cold War era, peopl¢ 
defined themselves by answering the question of"which side are we on?" This:has 
now been replaced with the question of"Who are we?," which illustrates that people 
I 
' 
are beginning to define their identity in terms of culture, not ideology. Those tliat 
I 
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share similar ancestry, religion, language, and values are coming together, while 
disconnecting themselves from those who are culturally different. 
After the collapse of communism, the West believed that democratic 
liberalism would triumph throughout the world. There was a belief that the non-
Western world would commit themselves to Western values of democracy, free 
markets, limite_d government, human rights, individualism, and the rule oflaw. 
However, this has certainly not been the case. In fact, the complete opposite has been 
true. Non-Western countries have been rejecting Western values and promoting their 
own (Huntington 2003, 184). East Asian societies are well on their way to equaling 
the West economically and Islamic countries have enough potential soldiers to dwarf 
the West in terms of manpower. Both economic and military expansion is essential 
for non-Westerners to break away from Western dominance. 
As Huntington argues, it is critical for the survival ofthe West to main~in 
military superiority, promote Western values, and to protect the cultural, social, and 
ethnic integrity of the West by restricting the numbers of non-Westerners admitted as 
immigrants or refugees (Huntington 2003, 190). Unfortunately, the West seems 
incapable of doing any, let alone all of these things. Non-Western civilizations, 
especially in East-Asia, are becoming more economically powerful and are enhancing 
their military capabilities. In Islamic regions, because of their large populations, they 
I 
are capable of creating large armies and are attempting to get more sophisticatep 
weaponry. In contrast, since the Cold War, the West has been less focused on 
14 
defense spending and national security and more focused on supporting its soci~ized 
welfare state. Furthermore, the West's efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons 
' I 
have been met, and will likely continue to be met, with limited success. 
In promoting values, ,the West is also lacking. Again, we only know wlio we 
are when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are' 
against. But again, the fundamental problem of the West is that it has a difficult time 
knowing what the West is, what it values, or what it should defend. The rejection of 
the possibility of objective moral truth and the overwhelming acceptance of valile 
relativism has clouded the West's identity. In contrast, most non-Western cultures 
have a clear sense of identity, know what they believe in, are willing to die for what 
they believe in, and are gaining momentum both economically and militarily. 
Furthermore, non-Western cultures see that the West has lost its identity and this is 
making them more eager than ever to promote their own cultural identities. As the 
West becomes mo~e atheistic, materialistic, decadent, immoral, and loses touch,ofthe 
fundamental values and beliefs that have guided Western life since its birth, non-
Western cultures are doing the opposite. Non-Western civilizations are reinforcing 
the values and beliefs of their own cultures. Furthermore, because the non-Western 
world sees the decline of morality in the West, they are now asserting their cultural 
superiority over the West. 
Like others who have studied the decline of the West, Roger Scruton believed 
' 
that identity is crucial for a culture. When a culture's identity is lost, it results ih an 
' 
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uncertainty of its purpose. The West was so strong because people began conceiving 
I 
themselves as a community of neighbors sharing language, customs, territory, and a 
I 
common interest in defense (Scruton 2003, 21). America in particular, was strbng 
! 
I 
because its people were very patriotic. One could argue that it was the sense o~ 
identity, purpose, and patriotism that was the vital force in building America. l;he 
I 
lifeblood of America, as Tocqueville stated, was its citizens coming together, being 
. ' 
sociable, being neighbors, and having a sense of belonging. Western borders h~ve 
I 
been decided by the courage, discipline, and self-sacrifice that stemmed from civic 
patriotism (Scruton 2003, 26). A public-spirited person gives time, energy, and 
resources for the benefit of the country. Good citizens remain attached to and 
dependent upon an ancestral ''we." 
One of the difficulties facing the West is that this type of virtue is rapidly 
decreasing (Scruton 2003, 61). Patriotic sacrifice has been dwindling in the W~st. 
Citizenship and civic virtue has been the goal and aspiration of Western political 
systems. People were bound by their duties to their fellow citizens and these duties 
sprang from a peculiar experience of membership. Citizens are first and foremost 
members of a society of strangers, committed to the defense of their common territory 
and maintenance of law that applies there. Loyalty is based on a sense of a common 
home. But today, the West appears to be more divided than ever. Due to relativistic 
multiculturalism, in America for example, there now appears to be more of a fopus on 
race, ethnicity, and gender differences, rather than on being American. Again, 
I 
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America was once a place that was viewed as a nation of different races and 
ethnicities that shared a common culture and creed. 
It is extremely difficult to preserve Western culture when it has lost its 
identity. If a culture no longer knows what it believes in or what it stands for, if 
I 
cannot adequately defend itself from those who seek nothing less than the destriiction 
! 
of it. A significant factor in causing the decline of the West is value relativism. 
17 
II 
Deeper Root of the Problem 
Liberal Education Under Attack 
Western civilization is deeply rooted in liberal education. Many would argue 
I 
that it was Socrates that founded liberal education in ancient Greece about 2500, years 
ago. Liberal education attempts to liberate people's minds, allow the developntent of 
new ideas and new opinions, and free people from their own ignorance and 
prejudices. "Liberal education is a sustained and open-minded examination of the 
deepest questions of human existence, an examination that is meant to free us of our 
prejudices in such matters" (Malcolmson, Myers, and O'Connell 1996, 5). Socrates 
claimed that the unexamined life was one not worth living. He believed that people 
should carefully examine all those opinions which serve as the foundation for ttje way 
in which they live. He argued that most notions that most people hold are not fteely 
chosen, but are rather forced onto them from whatever opinions dominate the world at 
that present time. The problem with this is that these opinions are often false, and 
because people do not like to question the fundamental opinions that touch the very 
core of their being, they prefer to live a life of ignorance. Ultimately, Socrates argued 
that, with effort, one can free oneself from mere prejudice and opinion, examin~ the 
world for oneself, and replace one's opinions with true knowledge. 
In Book VII of the Republic, Socrates emphasizes the importance of 
enlightenment in the allegory of the cave, which has become one of the most famous 
18 
metaphors in Western philosophy and has had a significant influence on Western 
civilization. In the allegory of the cave, Socrates depicts a scene in which a group of 
prisoners have been living in an underground cave since birth (Bloom 1991, 1J3). 
The entrance is very long and sunlight does not reach into the depths of the cave. The 
prisoners are bound by their legs and necks and are restrained in such a way that they 
cannot move freely or even look behind them, but are forced to look directly at the 
wall in front of them. The only source of light inside the cave is from a fire that is 
burning from behind. Behind the fire is a partial wall in which puppet-handlers 
manipulate objects to cast shadows on the wall in front of the prisoners. The 
prisoners spend their lives watching these shadows, and because these shadows are 
the only things that the prisoners see, they believe that these shadows are the only real 
things in the world. When the prisoners talk to one another about these images, they 
name them and when they hear sounds from the puppet-handlers, they believe that the 
shadows are making these noises. 
Then, one of the prisoners is released from his bonds. The prisoner is able to 
stand up, turn around, and see the fire that is burning behind him. Looking at the 
light of the fire is very painful and confusing to him (Bloom, 1991, 194). Not only is 
this the first time that the prisoner's eyes have seen direct light, but he has never seen 
anything other than the shadows on the wall. After his eyes focus and his 
disorientation subsides, he is able to look at the statues. He realizes that the statues 
are more real than the shadows. He learns how the light of the fire casts shadows of 
' 
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these statues and reflects images on the wall. He understands that these shadows are 
just copies of real objects. 
The prisoner is then dragged out of the cave. Force is needed to get the I 
prisoner out of the cave because the outside world frightens him and he would never 
leave willingly (Bloom 1991, I 94). He has lived his entire life in the cave and the 
cave is all that he knows. Once outside of the cave, the bright light from the sun 
blinds him. His eyes are not yet adjusted and focused, but he begins to see real 
objects. For the first time, as blurry as they may be to him, he sees real trees, real 
flowers, and real animals. The prisoner realizes that the statues in the cave were 
simply copies of these even more real things. After his eyes completely adjust to the 
light, he is able to look directly at the sun. He learns that the sun is the cause for 
everything he sees around him. He understands that the sun produces light which is 
responsible for all life. 
The cave analogy is meant to show the importance of developing one's 
intellect. The goal of liberal education is meant to drag everyone as far away from 
their caves as possible. Essentially, everyone is born into a cave. A child's brain is 
like a sponge, soaking up information from the world around him. The child's 
family, the school he will eventually attend, and the regime in which he lives in act as 
information sources. These sources provide citizens with opinions of right and 
wrong,justice and injustice, and all of the accepted views of his society. The cave 
represents a veil to reason and understanding. The problem with embracing the 
accepted views of one's society is that these opinions may not be correct. Everything 
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that a person has been taught, the very things that touch the core of their being, µiay 
' 
in fact be incorrect. Ultimately, Socrates argued that people should not blindly accept 
I 
the views of one's society just because those views are widely accepted. He argued 
I 
that people must acknowledge the prejudices of their society and of their own ! 
personal prejudices, attempt to break away from them, and investigate the world on 
their own using reason and deliberation. Rather than looking at mere images and 
' 
reflections on a wall, one must strive to grasp true knowledge. People must escape 
their caves, free their minds and pursue knowledge, and make prudential judgments 
about the fundamental questions for themselves. 
The allegory of the cave suggests that human beings live their lives on the 
basis of opinions about what is right and wrong and just and unjust. However, in 
most cases these opinions have not been carefully examined by the individual. In so 
far as most people do not investigate these fundamental questions for themselves, 
they are prisoners to the dominant ideas and opinions of their time (Malcolmsoµ, 
Myers, and O'Connell 1996, 15). Liberal education is vital for people to escape their 
caves and to become free thinkers. 
Unfortunately, liberal education has been under attack for some time now. 
The fundamental philosophical questions that once formed the basis ofliberal 
education are considered to be unimportant in the modem world (Malcolmson, 
Myers, and O'Connell 1996, 18). Opponents of the classical philosophical way·of 
teaching argue that philosophical discussions of themes such as right and wron~, 
good-and bad, and justice and injustice are unimportant because no truth can be: 
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gained from such investigations. They argue that ideas of what is right, what isrjust, 
and what is good are merely subjective opinions. They argue that anything tha~ 
cannot be scientifically proven holds no truth whatsoever. They believe that 
discussions of such things are pointless and take time away from students who could 
better spend their time doing more productive things, such as preparing students for 
their future employment. But a proper education should not simply prepare students 
for employment; it should prepare students to live well no matter what they do. It 
should challenge students to identify and examine the fundamental questions in hopes 
that this pursuit will make them noble, good, and thoughtful human beings. Since the 
days of the great ancient philosophers, there has been a growing rejection of objective 
moral truth and an increasing acceptance of value relativism in contradiction to liberal 
education, which has had a significant impact on Western Civilization, and as will be 
shown, has contributed greatly to its decline. 
Value Relativism 
The greatest threat to liberal education is one of the university's greatest 
exports: value relativism (Malcolmson, Myers, and O'Connell 1996, 18). Value 
relativism has certainly caused the erosion of liberal education and intellectualism in 
the West. "Value relativism is a doctrine that holds that all judgments of value are 
subjective in the sense that they are relative to the time, culture, or personality qfthe 
' I 
subject who makes them" (Malcolmson, Myers, and O'Connell 1996, 20). Value 
relativism embraces the notion that there are no universally true answers to the great 
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questions of mankind, which significantly differs from the views held by classic;al 
philosophers. The idea is that there is no good, no evil, no noble, no base, no virtue, 
no justice, and ultimately, no truth about anything that is fundamentally importiint. 
There are different variations of value relativism. Perspectivism holds that 
there is no such thing as objective moral truth because moral truth is relative to each 
individual (Malcolmson, Myers, and O'Connell 1996, 21). Perspectivists believe 
that everyone has their own unique perspective on things, moral judgments are 
relative to each individual, and one cannot possibly prove that any opinion is superior 
to another's opinion. They argue that because there is no universal conception of any 
moral principles, what one person believes to be justice, beauty, or honor, will not be 
the same for all individuals. They argue that all opinions of morality are equal 
because no one opinion is any better or any worse than any other opinion. 
Emotivism is based on the notion that facts are things that can be empirically 
tested, whereas opinions and value judgments are purely based on emotions of what 
people feel to be true (Malcolmson, Myers, and O'Connell 1996, 24). Emotivism 
makes the distinction between judgments of fact and judgments of value, known as 
the fact-value distinction. Emotivists argue that facts are things that can be 
empirically tested, proven, and validated by the scientific method. In contrast, they 
argue that values, because they cannot be scientifically tested and proven true, have 
no validity. They argue that because values come from people's emotions, they.are 
merely subjective judgments, whereas facts are objective because they are not b11sed 
on emotions, but rather come from solid empirical evidence. 
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Cultural relativism holds that value judgments are based on the views of 
society or culture that one lives in. It argues that because the values of one culture 
I 
! 
may not be the values of another culture, and because values are relative to particular 
I 
' 
cultures, values can have no objective validity (Malcolmson, Myers, and O'Connell 
I 
1996, 30). Culture relativists argue that value judgments are based on our own' 
cultural experience, which is infused into each individual through his own 
enculturation. Furthermore, because they argue that values are different from <me 
society to another, they reject the idea that there are any universal values, and argue 
that if there are, we have no way to gain knowledge of them. They argue that because 
values are products of one particular culture, one should not impose his cultural 
values onto another culture. As a result, cultural relativists reject the West's 
ambitions of spreading its cultural values throughout the world. 
Historical relativism, or historicism, like cultural relativism, reflects on the 
great diversity of opinion in the world (Malcolmson, Myers, and O'Connell 1996, 
35). Both are based on the idea that all thought is a product of environment. 
However, for historicism, diversity of opinion does not come from culture, but from 
history. Historical relativism holds that human beings cannot be understood apart 
from their historical c.ontext. Specifically, historicists believe that there is no natural 
order to the world that can be discovered by human reason and provide a permaµent 
model for human existence. They argue that each period in history has its own truths 
that are valid for that particular period, but not for all time. 
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Even more disastrous to a civilization than value relativism, is nihilism. 
Nihilism is the belief in nothing. Nihilists believe that there is no meaning to life, that 
there is no God, no morality, and no principles to guide social, economic, or political 
life (Malcolmson, Myers, and O'Connell 1996, 39). They argue that all notions of 
right and wrong, good and evil, and the like, are artificial products developed by man. 
Although value relativism is not nihilism, it does share with nihilism in the belief that 
objective moral truth does not exist. In essence, relativism is in between the Socratic 
view (the search for truth) and the nihilist view (there is no truth). As will be 
illustrated, many believe that once relativism is embraced by a civilization, the next 
progression in thought is that of nihilism. When a civilization embraces nihilism its 
intellectual and philosophical spirit dies, which in turn causes the civilization to die. 
This claim will be examined further when discussing Spengler's The Decline of the 
West. 
Value relativism .is lethal to liberal democracy. Liberal education is the quest 
for answers to life's great questions. Relativism, however, makes that quest pointless 
(Malcolmson, Myers, and O'Connell 1996, 40). Perspectivism and emotivism tell us 
that truth is relative to the individual. Cultural and historical relativism tell us that 
truth is relative to our culture or our age. From the classical perspective, though, 
value relativism is simply a justification for people to stick to their existing 
prejudices. Essentially, relativism allows us to dismiss what we do not like on the 
grounds that there is no truth and yet, at the same time, to cling to whichever views 
we do like. By doing this, people are essentially kept in their caves and allow their 
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prejudices and assumptions to prevail over reason because value relativism will! not 
I 
let them escape in the first place. So, although relativists deny moral objectivity and 
I 
argue that there is no proper way to live, they still have certain views that they nold 
! 
about life, but these views are not constructed through reason. 
The reason why relativism is so destructive to a civilization is because it 
forces people back down into their caves (Malcolmson, Myers, and O'Connell :J 996, 
41 ). It advocates that there is no truth in the world outside of science, all value~ are 
relative, and all opinions are,equal. It robs people of any real sense of purpose in life. 
By not attempting to explore the fundamental questions of mankind, people have 
essentially become enslaved in their own caves. 
The rejection of objective moral truth, has acted to undermine the core 
principles that have formed the basis of Western civilization and gave the West its 
identity. Leo Strauss argued that relativism has called into question the.possibility of 
any natural right, including the modem natural right doctrines that have legitimized 
the American regime (Strauss 1965, 2). Core principles, such as justice, which,have 
guided American life since its birth, have been attacked by relativists who argue that 
moral judgments are purely subjective and irrelevant to modem society. The ',\\est 
was once a place that believed in the possibility of discovering and living by 
universally true principles. 
However, the rejection of that is the same as saying that it is impossible to 
! 
differentiate between just and unjust, good and bad, and right and wrong (Stradss 
I 
I 965, 3). Because there is now an inability to acquire any genuine knowledge cif 
I 
26 
what is intrinsically good or right, it compels us to be tolerant of every opinion 'about 
I 
good or right, or to recognize all preferences or all civilizations as equally : 
respectable. The classical philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle believed in hatural 
' 
right. They believed that there were standards in nature for the correct way to live, 
even if they were difficult to discover and retained a degree of uncertainty. They 
believed that true knowledge of the fundamental questions of mankind could be 
gained. However, it is not so much knowledge of the absolute standards ofright and 
wrong that is important, but knowledge of what the fundamental questions are--
which ones they are and why they are fundamental. It is the pursuit of answers to 
these fundamental questions that has been part of the essential character of the West. 
The classical thinkers, such as Plato and Aristotle, whose ideas had a significant 
impact on Western civilization, believed that absolute truths did exist, even if difficult 
to ascertain, and that people should strive to live virtuously, which could only be 
achieved by expanding one's intellect and being philosophical. By expanding one's 
intellect and contemplating such matters, people are able to grasp knowledge of what 
is good, what is virtuous, and what is the best way to live. 
Western civilization has been drifting away from promoting such 
enlightenment. The fundamental questions of mankind are no longer viewed as' 
important as they once were. Instead of contemplating the very things that touch the 
core of our humanity, these things are routinely ignored. Essentially, people have not 
emerged from their caves and their minds are closed. 
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Value relativism is the opposite of natural right. Value relativists argue!that 
nature does not provide a standard for the correct way to live and that no knowiedge 
can be gained from studying these questions because they are merely subjectivJ, 
relative to an individual, a time in history, or a particular culture. They argue that 
there are no universally true answers to the great questions of mankind and tha{ there 
' 
is no natural order to the world that can be discovered by human reason to provide a 
' 
model for human existence. But if there are no universal norms, or universal 
principles that can guide human beings, one can see how this will lead to significant 
problems for a civilization. If all ideas of value are merely relative, then there cannot 
be any universal standard to follow. There can be no clear standards of good and bad, 
right and wrong, moral and immoral, or just and unjust. But men cannot live without 
the guidance that standards and principles provides them. When there is no standard 
in which to guide life, people become immoral. Moral decay in the West is 
exemplified by the rise in teenage pregnancy, single-parent families, increasing 
divorce rates, high levels of crime, drug abuse, pornography, violence in the media, 
perverse sexual behavior, adultery, lack of self-reliance and work ethic, materialism, 
decline in charitable giving, decline in social capital, atheism, and a myriad of other 
factors. Furthermore, relativism is destructive because it robs people of any real 
sense of purpose in life. If there is no truth in the world outside of science becaµse all 
values are relative and all opinions are equal, what aspiration can human beings; have? 
If life has no real meaning, no real purpose, and no real direction, then what's tite 
point? 
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Relativism in the form of the fact-value distinction is an intellectual mistake 
of modern times and helped to produce a crisis for Western civilization (Craig 1994, 
329). The assertion that there is no connection between facts and values is false. The 
fundamental questions such as what is right and wrong and good and bad can b.e the 
result of inductive reasoning based on the facts in so far as people make conclusions 
based on relevant evidence and experience (Craig 1994, 334). Moral judgments are 
not, then, subjective, unconnected to facts, or irrational. On questions of such things 
as justice and beauty, a variety of evidence can be looked at, there are certainly 
patterns that exist, and people can make rational decisions about such things. Valid 
arguments can be made about right and wrong, and one's judgment about these things 
need not be merely subjective. Similarly, there are certainly objective grounds for 
rationally preferring virtuous qualities such as justice and courage over qualities such 
as injustice and cowardice. However, because values are inductive, such opinions are 
always open to revision based on new evidence. This qualification makes moral 
certainty elusive, but it is the same qualification employed by natural science-new 
evidence may entail a revision of the inductive conclusions synthesized out of the 
facts and evidence to date. 
Moral judgments are opinions, but opinions based on evidence and reasoning. 
Hence, they can be valid, while remaining open to refinement and reconsideration 
(Craig, 1994, 335). Opinions are reasonable or unreasonable based on the arguments 
and evidence one uses to support them. Anyone can state his opinion, but what 
makes it valid or not is whether he can present a coherent argument using reason and 
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evidence to justify his position. Everyone is free to hold his own opinions, but ,that 
fact does not make all opinions equally true. 
The fundamental difficulty for modem liberal democracy, or the West as a 
whole, is that the quest to answer the fundamental questions of mankind has withered 
and the quest for objective moral truth has eroded. By not searching for the answers 
to these questions and by rejecting the possibility of objective moral truth, the West is 
losing a critical component of its character. As more and more people in the West 
embrace the notion that moral judgments are merely subjective, the pursuit to answer 
the fundamental questions is taken far less seriously and, as a result, the principles 
that originally laid the foundations for the West are being lost. Humankind has 
always asked these questions and it is our duty as intellectual beings to ponder and 
explore them. When people stop exploring the questions that touch the very core of 
their being, life becomes somewhat meaningless. The increasingly dogmatic 
acceptance of the view that values are not based on rational grounds effectively 
undermines our confidence in the principles that have guided Western life since its 
birth (Craig 1994, 329). 
Alan Bloom was concerned with protecting the philosophical way of life for 
future generations. He was strongly against value relativism and the rejection of 
objective moral truth and believed that this fundamental change in thought had 
significantly contributed to the decline of the West. He argued that by accepting 
value relativism and rejecting objective moral truth, the West has lost a significant 
part of its fundamental character, which he argued has resulted in a decline in 
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morality in the West (Bloom 1990, 21). Prior to the Enlightenment, the West 
believed strongly in objective moral truth. Principles, such as justice, played a 
significant role in shaping Western identity. The West promoted justice because it 
believed it was of vital importance. However, the importance of principles, such as 
justice, has been eroding. The West believes that ideas of things such as justice are 
simply opinions, that no one opinion is correct, and all such moral judgments ai;e 
relative and subjective. This has resulted in a decline of virtue in the West. Bloom 
argued that because the West has abandoned its moral principles, it has become 
morally decadent, as exemplified by its depraved obsession with many of the lowest 
of human bodily pleasures. Modem man is focused on personal gain and bodily 
pleasure, often achieved through immoral means, rather than aspiring to achieve the 
various forms of human greatness. 
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III 
Contemporary Embrace of Relativism 
Leo Strauss, among others, argued that modem man no longer knows what he 
wants, who he is, and can no longer recognize the difference between good an~ bad, 
right and wrong, and virtue and vice (Strauss 1988, 172). Strauss claimed that the 
decline of the West came in what he called the ''three waves of modernity." He 
argued that thinkers such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, etc. changed the way 
that people thought of the world, breaking away from classical thought. Strauss 
argued that the first wave consisted of Machiavelli and Hobbes. He said that both 
Machiavelli and Hobbes caused a fundamental change in how people viewed nature. 
Their views essentially gave rise to the notion that people are intrinsically bad and 
that people are motivated primarily by self-interest and material comfort. This first 
wave also gave rise to the notion that allotted nature of individuals was fixed and that 
they could never overcome their wickedness. This is opposite of the teachings of 
. classical philosophers, such as Plato who argued that people could attempt to improve 
their lives and strive for self-betterment through the continued effort to order their 
souls and through the pursuit of wisdom. 
One can see how classical philosophers, such as Plato, believed that the 
individual soul was not fixed and that people could better themselves through 
education. For example, in Plato's Republic, the goal is not primarily about how to 
create a perfectly just city; instead, it is a guidebook on how to live. Socrates' c/ty 
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was never intended to be an actual political reality; in fact, Socrates said himself it 
was highly unlikely that his city could ever come into being. Instead, Socrates 
believed that the regime in which he created in speech could more readily be achieved 
' 
at the individual level. Socrates' city is perfect because wise men, who are ruled by 
their rational souls and use reason above everything else, rule the city. The guardians 
develop their rational souls through education. Ultimately, the Republic is about 
opening one's mind to the world beyond mere appearances, to the truth about reality. 
It shows the importance of using reason and becoming enlightened. It is about 
wisdom, learning, and properly training one's mind. It is not about how to create a 
perfect city, but rather it is about how an individual can live a happy and fulfilled life, 
which Socrates argues, could only be achieved when an individual develops and 
perfects his intellect and arranges his soul into a harmonious order. Educating one's 
mind, perfecting one's rational soul, and seeking truth, according to Socrates, should 
be the aim for all people so far as possible. The Republic is about living one's own 
life well, or at minimum, how one ought to live. By structuring one's soul properly, 
in which the rational part rules, a person will be virtuous, will have genuine 
knowledge of the Good, the Beautiful, and all other forms. To this extent, Plato 
believed that objective moral truth was possible, and that a person should strive to 
answer the fundamental questions and live accordingly in so far as possible. He 
argued that true knowledge is the ability to grasp the world of forms with one's 
intellect. It is this philosophical tradition of examining such fundamental questions as 
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these through the use ofreason alone that forms an essential part of Western 
civilization and its once-vibrant intellectual life. 
Unlike the classical thinkers, Machiavelli and Hobbes did not believe tJat 
' 
human nature could be transformed. Machiavelli believed that people were gerierally 
I 
' 
wicked and must be controlled. Because people are intrinsically bad, he believ~d that 
' 
rulers could use whatever means necessary to keep order (Mansfield 1998, 22), In 
fact, Machiavelli believed that virtue itself was not intrinsically good, which 
significantly broke away from what Socrates argued. For Machiavelli, conventional 
' 
virtue is a quality that is praised by others, such as generosity, compassion, and'piety. 
He argued that a ruler should not avoid vices, such as cruelty or dishonesty, so long as 
by doing so, it would benefit the state. He argued that virtues and vices should be 
conceived of as means to an end in which every action by a ruler must be considered 
in terms of its overall benefit to the state, rather than in terms of its intrinsic moral 
value. Specifically, he argued that virtue should only be used for its consequence, 
rather than for its intrinsic value, unlike Socrates' belief that virtue should be sought 
for its intrinsic value and for its consequence. 
Machiavelli was the first philosopher to focus attention more on how mankind 
is rather than how they should be. He focused on how politics operates, not on how it 
should operate. He argued that because the real world is not perfect, it should npt be 
' 
treated as such (Mansfield 1998, 61). He argued that a ruler's goal is to maintain the 
I 
regime, and he can use both virtue and vice interchangeably to make sure order /s 
achieved. 
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Hobbes argued that the state of nature is a state of war (Tuck and Silverthorne 
2008, 23). He argued that men are by nature equal and nature has given them a right 
to all things, which causes conflict. In the state of nature, each man can use his 
strength to reach any ends he pleases. Ultimately, in the state of nature, it is every 
man against every man. Natural law is based on the notion that each man has the 
right of self-preservation. Because constant war is not good for one's self-
preservation, men enter into civil societies. Hobbes argued .that natural law is the 
right reason about what one should do or not do in order for self-preservation. Men 
seek peace when it can be had, and go to war when they have to. Any contracts or 
agreements made in the state of nature are in vain. If someone does a service for 
another man, and that man does not pay him back, there is no civil law to hold the 
wrongdoer accountable. The only law in the state of nature is the law of nature. If a 
man does not repay another man, they may go to war with one another, but war goes 
against self-preservation and reason. To avoid war men should stand by their 
contracts and agreements. The first law of nature (self-preservation) instructs each 
and every man, as the necessary means of securing peace, to make reciprocal 
transfers. Men should not be inconsiderate to others, not show hatred or contempt, 
not attempt to be superior to anyone else, and not be unfair because all of these things 
lead to war. Ultimately, reason teaches that peace is good. 
Hobbes argued that the natural laws (reason) are not enough to preserve .peace 
I (Tuck and Silverthorne 2008, 69). If the natural laws were enough to preserve peace, 
then there would be no need for civil societies. The practice of natural law is 
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necessary for the preservation of peace, and security is necessary for the practice of 
natural law. So, men come together and provide security to one another. But b,ecause 
! 
each man has his own will, and these wills often conflict, every man must sacrifice 
his own will to the will of the group for the co=on good. In every co=on~ealth 
(civil society), the man or assembly to whose will individuals have subjected 
themselves is said to hold sovereign authority. Hobbes argued that the security of the 
co=onwealth must be preserved through laws and penalties. Because security is 
the reason why men entered into civil societies and gave up their own will to the will 
of the co=onwealth, maintaining security is vital for a co=onwealth. Because 
each man has transferred his will to the will of the co=onwealth, it is the duty of the 
sovereign power, whether it is one man or an assembly, to make laws and enforce 
them for the good of civil society. 
In the state of nature decisions on what is good and evil are up to each man 
(Tuck and Silverthorne 2008, 81). In contrast, in a civil society, decisions on what is 
good and evil and right and wrong belong to the sovereign power. Hobbes made it 
clear that a ruler must ensure that factions do not arise and that any seditious opinions 
are eliminated, for if they are not, it will cause the co=onwealth to dissolve. He 
argued that a ruler must ensure the safety of his citizens, rule for the sake of the 
people not for sake of himself, and ensure that his citizens know the laws so they do 
not violate them. 
In contrast to Machiavelli and Hobbes that argued that people were generally 
i 
wicked and that the state of nature was the state of war, John Locke argued that 1 
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people were intrinsically good and that the state of nature was quite peaceful 
(Macpherson 1980, 9). For Locke, the state of nature was the state of perfect 1 
freedom. However, this freedom was not unlimited. In the state of nature peoJle had 
to abide by the law of nature, which is reason, or self-preservation. The state of 
nature was also a state of equality. Again, this equality was not unlimited equality. 
Everyone in the state of nature was equal insofar as there was no natural 
subordination of one individual to another. Essentially, no one person is naturally 
better than anyone else with regard to the wielding of political power. 
Hobbes made it very clear that he believed that the state of nature was the 
state of war. However, Locke argued that the state of nature was not the state of war 
but it was actually peaceful because people must abide by the law of nature, reason, 
which first of all dictates self-preservation (Macpherson 1980, 15). Ultimately, 
because people want to live and survive, they only fight when they are threatened. 
Because fighting is counterproductive to survival, men in the state of nature avoid 
conflict. However, although the state of nature is free, the state of nature is also full 
of fear. In the state of nature a strong person can, use physical strength and force to 
subjugate a weaker person. The state of nature is dangerous, not efficient, and it is 
difficult to protect freedom and property. Because of this, Locke argued that people 
come together and enter into civil societies. People form a social contract by which 
they escape the state of nature and agree to give up some of their freedom for more 
security. 
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So, classical philosophers, such as Socrates, did not believe that people :were 
intrinsically bad, as Machiavelli and Hobbes argued, or intrinsically good, as Locke 
argued. Instead, Socrates believed that people are good or bad depending on how 
' 
' 
they arrange their souls. By structuring one's soul properly, in which the ratio~al part 
rules, a person will be virtuous. In contrast, if a person's soul is not arranged 
properly and his irrational soul rules, he will be bad. 
The second wave consisted of Rousseau and Hegel. Both Rousseau and 
Hegel believed that freedom was important for the soul and that intrusions upOf! 
freedom were extremely harmful (Strauss 1988, 181). Here we see a significant 
difference between the first and second wave. The first wave consisting of the 
teachings of Machiavelli and Hobbes suggests that humans are wicked and that there 
is no hope in changing one's nature. As a result, the only way to maintain order is to 
control people with political institutions. In contrast, the second wave consisting_ of 
Rousseau and Hegel suggests that humans are generally good but that government in 
many ways acts to undermine personal freedom. 
Rousseau, like Locke, argued that men were intrinsically good. He described 
men in the state of nature as relatively peaceful (Gourevitch 1997, 136). Like Locke, 
Rousseau argued that men in the state of nature only acted violently when their self-
preservation was threatened. However, unlike Locke who believed men left the state 
of nature out of fear, Rousseau believed that men left the state of nature not out of 
fear, but through enlightenment and the development of language. 
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Because Hobbes and Machiavelli viewed people as being intrinsically 
wicked, they both promoted restrictive government. Machiavelli argued that a ruler 
could use whatever means necessary, virtue or vice, to maintain order. Hobbes! 
argued that once people enter into civil societies and give up their own will to the will 
of the government, all opinions of what is good, just, and lawful is no longer up to the 
people, but up to the sovereign power. So, Hobbes did not believe that citizens 
should contemplate such things because it is not their duty, but solely the duty of 
those in power. 
In contrast, because Locke and Rousseau believed that people were genc,:rally 
good, they advocated for freedom and warned against abusive and powerful 
government. John Locke did not believe in divine rule, or divine right, in which 
rulers were thought to get their power from God. Unlike Hobbes, who argued that 
when men enter into civil society they cannot question the authority of the sovereign 
power, Locke argued that if government fails to preserve individual freedom, then the 
people have the right to rebel against their sovereign power (Macpherson 1980, 80). 
He argued that because government is formed by the people through consent, the only 
legitimate form of government is a representative form of government. Locke's 
conviction of freedom is also evident from his belief in the separation of powers 
doctrine. 
Rousseau argued that the origin of inequality was not from the state of nature, 
but from the creation of civil societies (Gourevitch 1997, 112). He argued that a man 
in nature is rugged and well equipped to handle the elements. He lives off the land 
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and knows nothing of excess. In contrast, civil man knows nothing of moderation, 
which leads him to be unhealthy. Because civil man lusts, and always seeks to fulfill 
! 
I 
his appetites, this creates inequality. In civil societies, men always want more than 
' 
they need. Indulgence is not found in the state of nature, but is created by civil. 
' 
societies. In all, Rousseau explained that many of our ills are due to the exces~es and 
passions of modem society. He stated that because there are only a few sources of 
illnesses in the state of nature, savage man is ultimately healthier than civil man. 
Furthermore, Rousseau argued that medicine does not make civil man any healthier, 
because in society, civil man inflicts upon himself more ills than medicine can 
provide remedies for. 
Rousseau explained that his reasoning for emphasizing man's primitive 
condition is because it is necessary to understand the origins of inequality. He stated 
that there are natural inequalities that are found in nature, such as physical strength 
and ailments caused by old age, but that natural inequalities are not used for 
exploitation. Savage man uses his natural abilities for his own physical needs, not to 
maliciously exploit others. Rousseau argued that only until man becomes engulfed 
by societal pressures and becomes enlightened, does he begin to use his natural 
abilities at the expense of others. Essentially, he argued that natural inequalities 
increase as a result of civil inequality (Gourevitch 1997, 159). Civil man uses his 
natural abilities for his own personal advantage, which is usually at the expense of 
others. 
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' 
' 
In civil societies, man must create laws in order to keep in balance all of the 
' 
ills that are created by the exploitation of natural inequality (Gourevitch 1997, 1161). 
Laws in civil life are what keep order and peace. However, as civil life becomJs 
' 
more complex and integrated, more laws must be established to defend against the 
I 
rapid increase of more ills. Thus, a specific chain of command is established. There 
are those that are in power who make the laws, those that ensure that the laws ai:e 
upheld, and those that must abide by the laws or suffer dire consequences. Rousseau 
argued that civil man is less free than man in the state of nature because he is not in 
complete control of his life but is like a slave being dominated by his master. 
As has been shown, modern political philosophers, such as Hobbes and , 
Locke, and to some extent Rousseau, do not look at how one ought to live, but rather 
focus on how they believe people are, and then come up with arrangements they 
believe are beneficial. For Hobbes and Machiavelli, because they believed that 
people were intrinsically wicked, they promoted a restrictive form of government that 
has the ability to do whatever it needs to do to maintain order. In contrast, Locke and 
Rousseau, because they believed that people were intrinsically good, argued that 
government should not be as restrictive and that citizens should have certain 
freedoms. From this it is easy to see how contemporary thinkers differ significantly 
from classical thinkers. Socrates did not believe that people were intrinsically good 
or bad, but that people ultimately make this choice for themselves effectively through 
how they live. If a person allows the irrational part of his soul to control him then he 
I 
I 
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will become bad. If, on the other hand, a person uses reason, seeks to gain true 
knowledge, and allows his rational soul to flourish, then he will become good. , 
' Lastly, Strauss argued that this philosophical chain of events ultimately leads 
I 
to the third wave. The third wave consists of the philosophy of Nietzsche and , 
Heidegger. Nietzsche argued that objective moral truth could not be proven to exist 
and that moral truth is nothing more than one's prejudices and assumptions (Strauss 
1988, 224). Morality itself does not exist because objective moral truth does not 
exist. This wave gives rise to the philosophical doctrine of nihilism, the belief that 
existence is without objective meaning, purpose, or intrinsic value. Nihilists argue 
that there are no moral values with which to uphold a rule or logically prefer one 
action over another. For example, a moral nihilist would have to say that killing 
someone, for whatever reason, is not inherently right or wrong or good or bad, or that 
it is only bad in our eyes, given our culture or the time in which we live, but it is not 
simply wrong. 
Unlike the classical philosophers that believed in objective moral truth, 
Nietzsche argued that objective moral truth could not be proven to exist. Nietzsche 
claimed that objective moral truth is nothing more than one's prejudices and 
assumptions (Kaufmann 1966, 13). Because we are driven by our Will to Power, 
people want their prejudices and assumptions to dominate all others so that their will 
becomes truth. He argued that the Will to Power is such a strong force that freewill 
does not even exist. Because our will commands us in a particular way, he argued 
I 
I 
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that our actions are under the influence of unconscious drives that compel us in 
certain directions. 
Martin Heidegger argued that history, because it was a random process, ldid 
' 
not provide humans with any universal principles that can guide human actions 
(Malcolmson 1996, 36). He argued that each period in history has its own tru~s, and 
because truths are only valid for people living in that particular period, the best 
people can do is to embrace the truths of their society. However, this is essentially 
the same thing as people being unable to escape their caves. By embracing morals, 
not because they are necessarily based on truth, but rather because they are accepted 
at that current time, is counterproductive to enlightenment. Instead, people must 
come out of their caves and attempt to investigate the world for themselves. More 
importantly, people must recognize that all judgments of value are not merely relative 
to history, but that moral truth can be gained. 
As has been illustrated, classical philosophers spent their energy asking the 
questions of how one should live, how to make the best regime, and what the good 
life is. In the West today, the philosophical debate of how people should live, how 
the best regime can be created, and what the good life is, have in large part been 
neglected and a meaningful discussion of the fundamental questions has withered. 
The thought of modem thinkers such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, 
Nietzsche, and Heidegger caused a significant change in the West and their tho4ght 
prepared the way for the contemporary embrace of value relativism. Classical , 
political philosophy remained open to an ongoing examination of the human soul and 
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its possibilities, believing that it could lead to authoritative guidance in how to live 
I 
our lives. In contrast, the writings of some key modern political philosophers tend to 
I 
close off this investigation by asserting that human nature is simply good or bad and 
I 
cannot be transformed through education or at least habituation. 
' I 
Strauss argued that the last wave of modernity which would further enh~ce a 
' 
civilization's decline was nihilism. So, is the West heading toward nihilism? Ail 
evidence suggests that the West has indeed become more nihilistic. As was argued 
from the outset, the West does not even know what it values. The West no lon~er 
holds anything to be of intrinsic value, that is, it believes nothing can be defend~d 
rationally upon indisputable principles. Value relativism has caused Western values 
to no longer be authoritative. The belief that morals are merely in ''the eye of the 
beholder," is dangerous because in essence, any action could be justified because 
morals could be said to be subjective and relative to an individual, society, or culture. 
One can certainly see the implications that this type of thinking would have on a 
society. No action could be confirmed as being moral or immoral or just or unjust 
because these are mere value judgments that are relative to certain individuals. 
Morality would no longer have significance, and as a result, people would no longer 
strive to be moral. Because there has been an erosion of the pursuit of objective, 
moral truth, ideas of right and wrong and just and unjust have been clouded. What 
' 
has resulted is nothing less than a decline in morality in the West. Things that were 
I 
once strongly opposed because people believed them to be immoral are now being 
I 
tolerated and accepted. If there are no moral truths, and all judgments of value are 
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subjective, then nothing becomes valuable which results in everything being equal, or 
having the same value. So in essence, any action, no matter how just or unjust, moral 
I 
I 
or immoral, is equal. This is why value relativism and the rejection of the possibility 
- I 
of objective moral truth are both extremely destructive to Western civilization. [ 
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IV 
Decline of the West's Philosophical Spirit 
Decline of Regimes in the Republic 
When intellectual activity, especially philosophy, fades, creativity ends,· 
stagnation within a culture arises, and the culture begins to die. The loss of a serious 
intellectual pursuit of the fundamental questions is a significant contributing factor to 
the West's decline. Value relativism and the rejection of the possibility of objective 
moral truth is an intellectual and philosophical mistake. The closing of minds is also 
what Socrates said would cause the decline of his city in speech. Socrates argm;d that 
his city, and corresponding perfect man, would inevitably decline and degenerate 
overtime for this very reason (Bloom 1991, 223). 
In the Republic, Socrates explained that there were four forms of injustice in 
the city and man, and five arrangements of the city and five corresponding 
arrangements of private men. First, there is an aristocracy, followed by a timocracy, 
then an oligarchy, a democracy, and finally a tyranny. Socrates argued that each of 
these regimes and corresponding man was worse than the previous regime and man. 
Specifically, he argued that an aristocracy would decline into a tirnocracy, a 
timocracy would decline into an oligarchy, an oligarchy would decline into a 
democracy, and a democracy would decline into a tyranny. These five regimes are 
meant to show the inevitable decline and degeneration through which the just city and 
' 
just man will inevitably go. 
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Socrates' perfectly-just city is an aristocracy, the best regime for producing 
justice. In an aristocracy, the city is ruled by philosopher-kings that are the wisest 
I 
' and most public-spirited. They know what is best for the city and are best suited to 
I 
rule. In the corresponding man, the aristocratic man is most wise and just. An 
aristocratic man is ruled by the rational part of his soul. His soul is in perfect 
' harmony and arranged in such a way that his rational part rules over the spirited! and 
I 
' 
appetitive parts. 
Socrates argues that the aristocracy will eventually degenerate into a 
timocracy. In the city, the regime is ruled by men that love honor above everything 
else (Bloom 1991, 224). In the corresponding man, the timocrat is ruled by the 
spirited part of his soul. Socrates argues that a timocracy comes into being when the 
ruling class in an aristocracy changes. The guardians of the aristocracy will 
inevitably make mistakes in selecting their predecessors and will choose rulers that do 
not have the correct natures to rule. Essentially, the wrong types of people become 
rulers, which leads to the degeneration of the city. 
Factions will also arise in the city. One group, the unworthy and unfit rulers, 
will want to change things by moving away from the traditions, customs, and values 
of the city (Bloom 1991, 225). They will want to change things so that the guardians 
can have wealth and private property. Those that are truly fit to rule and have the 
correct natures to rule do not want to change the existing order of things . .They reject 
I 
I 
any changes and want to preserve the old way of life. After battling amongst each 
I 
other, Socrates said that there will eventually be some type of agreement betweJn the 
I 
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two groups. To please the unworthy guardians, the worthy guardians decide to , 
' I 
distribute land and houses to be held privately, and enslave the producers as serfs. 
' I 
They will occupy themselves with war and with guarding against the serfs. Th~ 
' 
' guardians will still not do any farming, manual labor, or any other money-makiitg 
' 
' 
venture. Socrates said that although they will desire money, the love of victory and 
honor will be their ultimate goal. Because of this, they will not select wise 
successors, but will rather choose those that who love war and are excellent at it. 
Ultimately, the wrong type of people with the wrong type of natures will enter into 
positions of power, which will essentially destroy the aristocracy. 
Similarly, the aristocratic man will decline into a timocratic man. A 
timocratic man is ruled by the spirited part of his soul (Bloom 1991, 226). Socrates 
argues that such a man is produced when he is the son of a good aristocratic man, but 
that he is tainted by his mother and her servants. His mother complains, saying that 
they are not wealthy enough. She says that her husband is not courageous because if 
he was, he would use his natural abilities to pursue wealth and achieve fame. 
Essentially, she pulls the child towards loving money. The child ends up being 
somewhere in between: a haughty-minded man who loves honor above everything 
else. 
Next, the timocracy degenerates into an oligarchy. In the city, the love for 
money grows so much that the ruling class is consumed with the desire for wealj:h 
(Bloom 1991, 228). A city with an oligarchic regime is one that loves money above 
I 
' everything else. In the corresponding man, an oligarch is one that is ruled by his 
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necessary appetites, which is derived from the desiring part of his soul. A timocracy 
declines into an oligarchy when the love of money grows and two groups arise in the 
I 
I 
city, those that are wealthy and those that are poor. In an oligarchy, only the ric,h 
! 
have power in government and the poor have absolutely no voice in politics and are 
I 
I 
treated unfairly. Choosing who is going to rule the city is based solely on wealtp.. 
! 
Socrates then goes on to list several mistakes of this regime. First, it is no longer 
ruled by anyone who is fit to rule. Second, the city has no unification; there are two 
groups, the wealthy and poor, who constantly battle each other. Lastly, the city can 
no longer defend itself because the rulers are afraid to arm the people in fear that the 
people will revolt against them. 
Socrates argued that a timocratic man degenerates into an oligarch when he is 
a timocrat' s son, and his father loses his wealth in some type of accident (Bloom 
1991, 230). The son becomes fearful oflosing money and of being poor. The child 
desires to overcome his poverty and uses allofhis natural abilities to make money. 
His soul no longer cares for honor, but only cares for money. The appetitive part of 
his soul is in command. The only thing that keeps him somewhat restrained is that he 
loves money so much that he does not want to do anything that would cause him to 
lose it. He is not likely to break the law or do anything illegal because of the fear of 
being caught and having his money taken acts to restrain him. He puts on an outward 
fayade of being a good person, but he is internally flawed. He is very stingy, and only 
cares about bettering himself. 
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An oligarchy then degenerates into a democracy. In the city, a democra~ic .. 
regime is one in which is ruled by unnecessary appetites (Bloom 1991, 223). IJ the 
I 
corresponding man, the democratic man is ruled by the appetitive part of his soJ1, 
' 
' 
more so than in the oligarch. An oligarchy declines into a democracy when the love 
I 
for money has grown out of control and it is all that the rulers of the city care ab~ut. 
There is a lending of money at high interest rates which makes most people vef):' 
poor. Eventually, the poor revolt against the rich. After the revolt, the poor create a 
new constitution which is structured in such a way that all men have an equal voice in 
politics so that political corruption will not happen again in the future. However, 
Socrates argued that the problem with a democratic regime is that people who should 
have no business in politics have political power and these people make unwise 
decisions that adversely affect the city. Because everyone is equal, there are no roles 
that anyone must follow. Essentially, in a democratic regime, people have the 
freedom to become anything they want. Again, Socrates argued that this is not good 
because people begin to occupy roles for which they are not naturally suited to 
occupy which causes the city to decline further. Additionally, the principle of 
specialization is gone once the city has declined into a democracy. Everyone's role is 
mixed and no one class has a definitive function in the city. 
Before explaining how a democracy arises in the individual man, Socrates 
first illustrates the difference between necessary and unnecessary desires. Nece~sary 
desires are those that human beings cannot train to overcome, or things that people 
. I 
need for survival, such as food, water, and shelter (Bloom 1991, 236). In contrast, 
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unnecessary desires are those that human beings can train to overcome, such as 
luxuries. The oligarch is ruled by necessary desires, but his son desires all the best 
things in life and all .of its luxuries. When he gets older he has no sense of 
moderation. He is wasteful and shameless. 
and live a lavish lifestyle. 
I 
He has no goal in life but to spend roney 
Lastly, a democracy will inevitable decline into a tyranny. In the city, the 
' 
freest regime (democracy) degenerates into the most enslaving regime (tyranny) 
(Bloom 1991, 240). Tyranny in the city is one that is ruled by unlawful appetites. In 
the individual man, the tyrant is ruled by the appetitive part of his soul, even more so 
than the democratic man. A democracy declines into a tyranny because all of the 
city's focus and attention is on freedom. Because of freedom, unfit people have 
positions of power and they make poor decisions that have disastrous effects on the 
city. Ultimately, freedom is democracy's downfall. Freedom spreads to every facet 
of life and anarchy results. There are more and more drones in the city. The drones 
are like parasites because they are unproductive citizens; they take everything from 
the city but never give anything back. These drones blame the rich for all of the. 
problems of the city and they advocate for change. Then, a man that promises change 
arises and becomes a voice and a leader of the drones. This leader attacks the 
wealthy and gives to the poor. He becomes loved by the people. He eventually gets 
into power and controls the army and becomes unstoppable. Because he is ruled by 
his appetitive soul and has unlimited power, he uses all of his resources for his om 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
personal gain. He must constantly make war so that the peciple are distracted from 
what he is really doing. By the end, the city no longer has a hint of justice left. i 
The tyrannical man is the son of a democratic man. His father indulges his 
unnecessary desires, but he is not lawless (Bloom 1991, 253). The democratic inan 
I 
had a father that was an oligarch, so he was reared with some type of restraint. fie 
allowed himself to make money and become rich, but he did not gain money 
unlawfully. However, his son becomes unlawful because he is corrupted by the, 
drones of the city. He becomes a man that is driven by unlawful appetites. The, 
tyrannical man is consumed by his desires. He will do anything to get more wealth 
and more power. He is completely unlawful and unjust. His appetitive soul is in full 
command and it drives him to do unspeakable things. The tyrannical man is actually 
in agony. The soul of a tyrannical man is enslaved by his own desires and pleasures. 
He is driven to steal, hurt, and even kill to get what the lowest part his soul desires. 
The tyrannical man is in pain and is extremely unhappy because he is consumed with 
erotic desires. 
Socrates explains that the highest good that an aristocra~y can achieve is 
virtue, the highest good that a timocracy can achieve is honor, the highest good that 
an oligarchy can achieve is wealth, the highest good that a democracy can achieve is 
freedom, and finally, the highest good that a tyranny can achieve is erotic love and 
pleasure (Bloom 1991, 270). Socrates argued that an aristocratic regime and 
corresponding aristocratic man are best. The aristocratic regime is governed by I 
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leaders that are ruled by their rational soul, use reason, and are just. The aristocratic 
man is also ruled by his rational soul and is most just. 
I 
Again, Socrates' city in speech should not be taken literally because Socrates 
I 
' 
said himself that it was highly unlikely that the city he created could ever come .into 
I being. Instead, the Republic should be viewed on a personal level, or as a guidebook 
on how one ought to live. For Socrates, the best way for a human being to live is by 
using the rational part of their soul and gaining knowledge of the world. A man. ruled 
by the rational part of his soul is most wise and knows how to best live his life. He 
strives for true knowledge and attempts to answer the fundamental questions of 
mankind. He recognizes that virtues are real and unchanging, and understands that 
these things are meaningful and should guide his life. 
However, as Socrates argued, in every regime, there is an inevitable and 
unavoidable loss of intellectual or philosophical activity .. Instead of men using the 
rational part of their souls and seeking knowledge, they close their minds and 
increasingly seek bodily pleasures. They begin t1J be ruled by their spirits and then 
the appetitive part of their souls. Instead of investigating the fundamental questions 
of mankind and ideas about how one ought to live, they instead focus all their time on 
figuring out how to fulfill their inner desires. Instead of being lovers of wisdom, they 
become lovers of money, power, and pleasure. As a result, there is a loss of 
traditions, customs, and morality. The core principles that made the foundation 1:Jf a 
' culture are criticized, ignored, and ultimately rejected. Things that were once juclged 
I 
53 
to· be immoral become accepted over time because there is a rejection of those tl/ings 
that once formed the foundation of the culture. 
' 
By embracing value relativism and rejecting the possibility of objective inoral 
I 
' 
truth, the West has also gone through an intellectual and philosophical decline similar 
' 
to the decline of regimes in the Re pub lice Again, the fundamental questions such as 
what is right and wrong and good and bad are not invalid. Moral judgments are not 
. ' 
irrational or subjective because they can be the result of inductive reasoning. By not 
searching for the answers to these questions and by rejecting the possibility of 
objective moral truth, the West is losing a critical component of its character. As 
more and more people in the West embrace the notion that moral judgments are 
merely subjective, the attempt to answer the fundamental questions is taken far less 
seriously and as a result the principles that originally laid the foundations for the West 
are being lost. The increasingly dogmatic acceptance of the view that values are not 
based on rational grounds effectively undermines our confidence in the principles that 
have guided Western life since its birth and has caused a decline in morality in tµe 
West (Craig 1994, 329). 
Nietzsche and Spengler's Examination of Culture and History 
In The Decline of the West, Spengler exhaustively investigated the origin, 
decline, and future of the European-American Western civilization. Spengler ar~ued 
that unlike classical and Indian civilizations that were unhistorical, Egyptian and 
I 
I 
I 
Western man is very historical (Spengler 1991, 7). For the classical civilizations, 
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that is, the civilizations that existed before Greece and Rome, history never beciµne 
an intimate part of their soul and they lacked a historical feeling. In contrast, 
Egyptian and Western man is very historical. Egyptians mummified their dead bd 
I 
I 
carved symbols and dates into stone, which all acted to preserve their history. 
Western man is the collector of antiquities, coins, and manuscripts. Western man is 
very historically sensitive, viewing the distant past and scanning the distant prospect, 
living in his time, yet essentially not of it. In the classical world, we see nothing of 
' 
this sort. Spengler argued that present-day man is consumed by time. 
Spengler also argued that by learning about different courses taken by otp.er 
civilizations, one can better understand his own culture and identity (Spengler 11991, 
11 ). Spengler, like Hegel before him, subscribed to historical relativism. 
Specifically, he believed that the insights of one era are not valid in another timt; or 
culture. The values of one culture at one certain point in time are not the same values 
of another culture of a different point in time. He argued that things are only relative 
to a time or culture and that there are no external truths because every truth is just the 
expression of a certain time in history. What may have been true at one point in time 
may not have any validity in another point in time. More importantly, Spengler· 
believed that it was the duty of each man to see what men of other cultures have: 
created. He argued that what is significant is not whether past thinkers' insights.are 
relevant today, but whether they were exceptionally relevant to their own time. 
Spengler rejected the Euro-centric view of history (Spengler 1991, 13). He 
I 
saw all cultures and times as equally important in the development of history. ~e 
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argued that each culture has its own image, passions, life, and death. Each culture has 
i 
its own ideas and expressions. Each culture rises, ripens, decays, and dies. He ; 
I 
argued that the problem with Western thinkers is that they have a world-view of 
history, meaning that they only care about history that they consider relevant and 
I 
I 
important and do not look at other cultures outside of their own. He argued not ;only 
that Western man is a very historical being, but that he is absorbed with his own 
culture's history, his own life, and his own time. Spengler argued that in order t.o 
understand history truly, one must free oneself from the limitations of his own 
culture's ideas. One must look at other cultures, other ideas, and look outside of what 
their own society says is important. Because Spengler was a relativist, historical data, 
I 
in his mind, was an expression of a certain time and culture relative to that culture 
and time. He believed that people must study history free from their own 
prepossessions. But he argued that Western man does not do this. Western man 
views history as one-sided, superficially, prejudiced, and limited. Spengler argued 
that contemporary Western man has been too conscious of the classical age of ancient 
Greece and Rome and is completely influenced by the past (Spengler 1991, 22). 
Spengler argued that the decline of the West comprises nothing less than the 
problem of civilization (Spengler 1991, 24). He believed that civilization is the 
fulfillment and end of a culture. Whereas a culture is inward and growing, a 
civilization is outward and expanding. He saw civilization as the destiny of every 
culture. He argued that civilizations are what cultures become when they are no: 
' i 
' longer creative and growing. Spengler argued that because modern man does not 
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create anything new, but rather focuses on the past, this has caused the decline o:f the 
Western world. Spengler argued that the Greeks and Romans were imaginative [and 
I 
active, but as their creativity degenerated, they declined into the Roman civilization. 
I 
' 
' Essentially, he believed that the Roman civilization was the erosion of Greek ani:l 
' 
I 
Roman culture. He argued that by the end of the Roman culture, people only caj-ed 
about money, entertainment, were unspiritual, no longer philosophical, did not come 
up with any new ideas, lost their artistic ability, became brutal and unjust, and f!!ded 
into nothingness. Spengler argued that Rome's expansive tendency led to its decline. 
Although Rome conquered much of the known world and expanded their empire, 
because they were so outwardly focused, and not inwardly focused as cultures are, the 
empire began to decline into a civilization. 
Spengler asserted that in his time, which was the early nineteenth century, 
Western man no longer exhibited a culture, but a civilization (Spengler 1991, 30). 
He argued that modem man does not create any new ideas, but rather looks back at 
past thinkers and critiques their thought. Spengler argued that the last form of 
philosophy that the West will encounter is skepticism, which he argued was not really 
philosophy at all. 
Spengler thought that a culture is born in the moment when a great soul 
awakens and something new and creative blooms in the soil (Spengler 1991, 74). 
Each culture has its childhood, youth, manhood, and old age. Each culture is cri;ated 
' 
' 
when it has new ideas of religion, art, politics, social life, economy, etc. Each culture 
arises within a specific geographical area and is defined by its internal coherencl of 
I 
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style in terms of what it values. Spengler argued that there are phases of rise and . 
decline of every culture. In the spring, there is grand intuition, powerful cultural 
creation awakens, the concept of god and religion is created, arts are born, and : 
politics arise. In the summer, there is a maturing consciousness, urban cities evolve, 
critical thought develops, there is a reformation of religion, art expands, and differing 
political ideas come into being. In autumn, the culture is at its height. In the winter, 
the culture begins to die because nothing new is created. Creative thought devolves, 
religion is replaced with materialism, there is a decline of abstract thinking, art 
becomes meaningless and is only a subject of fashion, skepticism replaces truth, and 
the culture dies. 
Spengler argued that every thought, faith, and value dies when the spirit of the 
culture is extinguished (Spengler 1991, 90). As the ideas that once formed the 
lifeblood of the culture are no longer expanded, and nothing new is created, the 
culture turns to skepticism. Spengler believed that the decline of a culture is marked 
by the transvaluation of all values of that particular culture. There is a reevaluation 
and questioning of the culture's religious beliefs and values and these things are 
eventually rejected altogether. Spengler argued that only at the end of a culture do 
ideas become questioned or denied. 
Spengler argued that the Western soul has exhausted its inner possibilities. 
Whereas classical men investigated the world and created new ways of thinking1 
contemporary thinkers create nothing new because they are only focused on 
critiquing past thought. Because the West stopped creating, it turned to skeptici~m 
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which has resulted in the West denying the very things that gave birth to its cultµre. 
' 
Although Spengler took the position of a historical relativist, he did illustrate th\) 
I 
importance of belief in absolute truths to a culture. The birth of a culture is achjeved 
I 
when new ideas of values, religion, and language are created. At the birth of ev~ry 
' 
culture, there is a general belief in objective moral truths. However, as time pas'ses, 
. I 
the culture no longer expands on these truths but rather reexamines them and 
eventually denies them altogether. When a culture no longer creates, it begins to 
decline and deteriorate. 
Many of Spengler's ideas are derived from Nietzsche's critique ofmodeinity 
and in particular his examination of culture and history. In "On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life," Nietzsche also illustrates the problem of history 
and what happens when a culture loses its cultural creativity. Nietzsche's main , 
argument is that there can exist an excess of historical education that is 
counterproductive to life and culture. Unlike animals that live in the moment and do 
not think of the past, men cling to history (Breazeale 2007, 60). Although a map has 
the ability to forget the past at certain times, the past is always with him and will 
inevitably come back to his awareness. Nietzsche argued that the ability to forg~t the 
past is conducive to happiness. Because animals live unhistorically, insofar as they 
do not think of the past, they live in a type of ignorant bliss. Unlike animals that do 
not have the capability to be historical, man is an historical being. However, man, 
through forgetting, can be unhistorical at times. When one forgets, he is at that time 
I 
I 
living unhistorically. 
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Nietzsche argued that forgetting is essential to action (Breazeale 2007, 62). If 
one is always thinking of the past, he can never do any type of action. Nietzsch'e 
I 
argued that the historical and unhistorical are equally necessary for the health of an 
individual and of a culture. One must be able to forget at the right time and one: must 
also be able to remember at the right time. If one clings too tightly to the past, ~e will 
never be able to let go of the past and cannot do anything to enhance the present and 
future. In contrast, if one is completely unhistorical, history would have not taught 
him anything, which is equally bad. 
Being historical has its benefits. By being historical one reflects, compares, 
distinguishes, and draws conclusions. However, Nietzsche argued that too much 
history is bad (Breazeale 2007, 62). He argued that the Germans of his day were so 
consumed with history that they lacked a culture of their own. He argued that itjodem 
man drags around with him all sorts of knowledge of the past and does nothing for the 
,present or future. Because modem man clings to the past, he never creates anything 
new. Nietzsche argued that every historical event has taken place during times of 
being unhistorical because people can only act when they stop thinking. When man 
forgets the past, he becomes creative. The problem is that modem man's obsess.ion 
with histo,rical education has led to a decline of life and culture in the present. When 
people are young they are creative and act on their ideas and beliefs. However, 
through historical education, people lose faith in their ideas and action is suppressed. 
The ideas and beliefs of the past replace the creative new ideas and beliefs of 
60 
contemporary man. Western.man no longer thinks on his own, but is completely 
inundated with the ideas and beliefs of those in the past. 
Nietzsche argued that one should not be completely unhistorical or completely 
historical, but should rather be suprahistorical (Breazeale 2007, 66). Again, the 
completely unhistorical person ignores history altogether and is not able to derive 
some of the benefits that history provides. In contrast, the completely historical 
person is always thinking of the past and never acts on his own. He delves deeply 
into the study of history but can never act because he is too absorbed with the past. 
He reflects on the great civilizations of the past and realizes that great people with 
great minds once existed. Many of these people want to preserve and protect the past 
so they reject any new ideas. They have a tendency to believe that greatness already 
existed in the past and cannot possibly exist again. The problem with this belief is 
that they do not attempt to pursue new greatness that would benefit their present 
culture. Anything new and evolving is rejected and persecuted. They are so focused 
on history that they do nothing to generate anything new that may benefit society. 
They serve the past but do not serve the present and this paralyzes greatness. It 
hinders any attempt to try something new. Because they have resentment for the 
present, they are counterproductive to life and culture. 
The suprahistorical man is different from the completely historical and 
completely unhistorical man. Nietzsche argued that a suprahistorical man has the 
ability to recognize when historical reflection must end and unhistorical action n:i,ust 
take place (Breazeale 2007, 67). The suprahistorical man studies the past but knows 
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when to act. These people study the historical events that will enable them to 
improve the present and future. They employ history for the purpose of life. 
Nietzsche argued that present-day men of action can use history to look back ori past 
I 
' 
men of action and gain insight and inspiration from them. This helps them become 
I 
stronger and leads to greatness. By using history wisely and gaining insight from 
previous great men of action, this helps current men of action to act and produce new 
history. By studying great men of the past, Nietzsche argued that it would enco?l'age 
the great men of the present to act. 
For Nietzsche, the task of the new age is to understand that history must itself 
resolve the problem of history. Instead of clinging to history and believing that the 
best has already come and gone, mankind must rather have awareness of the present 
and realize that greatness can still be achieved (Breazeale 2007, 71). Things that are 
new and original must not be hindered by history but should be promoted by it. One 
must look at the past and judge and interrogate it. We must look to great men of the 
past for strength, and in turn, know when to stop studying history and actually act on 
our own to make our present and future better. He argued that modern men may have 
knowledge of culture, but do not have a culture of their own, just a knowledge of past 
customs, arts, philosophies, religions, and discoveries. He argued that it should )le the 
task of the great men of today to rise above the mediocrity, to believe in themselves, 
to stop being mere spectators, and ultimately to honor the present and attempt to 
make it better. 
62 
What can be taken from Nietzsche and Spengler in this regard, is that 
intellectual or philosophical activity is vital for the survival of a culture. When a 
' 
culture loses its philosophical spirit it begins to decline. The rejection of the 
possibility of objective moral truth and the wide acceptance of value relativism is 
evidence that the West's philosophical spirit has indeed declined. The pursuit of 
objective moral truth, the fundamental questions, the very things that touch the yery 
core of our being and has guided Western life since its creation are being rejected. 
' 
One could argue that the West is now showing symptoms of being in Strauss' third 
wave, or what Spengler said would comprise of a culture's winter phase. The West 
has a very difficult time identifying what it now values. Principles that have been 
present since the birth of Western civilization and gave the West its identity, such as 
justice for example, have eroded and taken on less significance due to value 
relativism, which has caused morality in the West to decline. 
Historical Comparison to the Fall of Rome 
One can see the effect of losing one's cultural identity and philosophical 
activity had on Rome. At its peak, the Roman Empire was a massive entity. The 
' 
Romans had conquered much of the world and had spread their arts and languag~ to 
the far reaches of the known world. Rome was the most civilized nation and it had a 
sense of public magnificence. The principles of social life, laws, agriculture, and 
science which had their roots in Athens, were flourishing in Rome. Its emperors, were 
' I 
more or less virtuous and ruled their empire well. The Roman army was the most 
I 
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powerful military in the world, its soldiers skillfully trained, well disciplined, arjd 
courageous. Its citizens had a sense of national honor, civic virtue, dignity, 
patriotism, and a love for the motherland (Gibbon 1998, 41). 
Gibbon argued that 96 AD to 180 AD was a time in which Rome was most 
prosperous. During this era, Rome was ruled by Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, and th~ two 
' 
Antonines. This was a time of peace, happiness, and success. Rome was governed 
by absolute power, but under the guidance of the wisdom and virtue of its virtu~us 
rulers (Gibbon 1998, 81). This was a time of moderate rulers and moderate policies 
and its citizens had a lot of freedom. However, after the death of Marcus Anton/ne, 
Rome began to decay. Specifically, Gibbon argued that the virtuous rule ofNerva, 
Trajan, Hadrian, and the Antonines was followed by the rule of oppressive and 
tyrannical successors, which led to Rome's fall. As Rome's public figures bec11111e 
corrupt, so too did the people. The fire of genius was extinguished and the military 
spirit evaporated. National honor became lost, patriotism declined, and there was no 
longer a sense of danger. The science of physics and astronomy which gained 
momentum and flourished began to decline. Philosophical activity faded and there 
were no new great discoveries (Gibbon 1998, 83). 
Gibbon argued that Marcus Antonine, when naming his son Comrnodus \iS his 
successor, marked the start of the Empire's decline (Gibbon 1998, 74). This was the 
first time that a son had succeeded his father since Titus in 79 AD. Comrnodus ~as a 
cruel ruler. There was a conspiracy in which a senator sent an assassin to kill i 
The assassination was unsuccessful and it left .Commodus hating aJd Comrnodus. 
64 
fearing the senate. While Co=odus enjoyed his luxurious lifestyle, his people were 
faced with poverty, famine, and disease. Commodus knew nothing of moderation 
' 
and indulged in all of his appetites. The Roman people began to hate the emperpr and 
civil war erupted. Co=odus was eventually executed in his drunken sleep. 
After Co=odus' death, Rome faced a series of bad rulers (Gibbon 1998, 
83). The emperors and senate members that followed Marcus Antonine were unjust, 
deceitful, and corrupt. There was a strain of nonstop conspiracies by emperors (o kill 
senators, and senators conspiring to kill emperors. Emperors paid little attention to 
their people's concerns and only cared about spending extraordinary amounts of 
money to pay for their lavish lifestyle, which included the building of massive 
monuments. To pay for the extravagant lifestyle of the Roman public figures, 
citizens were taxed excessively. Bad ruler after bad ruler plagued Rome. Corruption, 
conspiracy, and fighting over who should rule led to Rome's demise. 
After the death of Severus Alexander in 235 AD, there was nearly 50 years of 
disorder, civil wars, economic chaos, regional rebellions, and various external threats 
(Gibbon 1998, 131). The long wave of bad rulers left Rome in turmoil. Its eco~omy 
was falling, its strength slipping, and far reaching provinces were left exposed to the 
barbarian invaders. By 260 AD, the population of Rome had been significantly 
reduced by invasions, rebellions, famine, and plague. During Rome's near collapse 
between 235 and 284, Rome was ruled by 20 to 25 emperors, most of which were 
unjust and left the empire in turmoil. 
65 
During this time, Roman religion also began to lose its luster. The successive 
I 
wave of bad rulers led to a disregard for Roman religious traditions (Gibbon 1998, 
122). The Romans, who were traditionally polytheists, began to become influeJced 
I 
by the monotheistic religion of Christianity. By 280, polytheism mythology faded 
I 
I 
and Christianity rose to prominence. Christians, who were once persecuted, began to 
I 
be tolerated by Roman emperors. Because these bad rulers only cared about money, 
instead of preserving their traditional religion and keeping Christianity from rising, 
they instead allowed Christian churches to be erected and forced these churches to 
pay taxes. 
In many regards, Gibbon argued that Christianity contributed to Rome's 
decline and fall. Ultimately, Gibbon believed that Christianity replaced the need for 
philosophy. He argued that prior to the rise and acceptance of Christianity in Rome, 
Roman life was primarily influenced by the teachings of the classical philosophers, 
and this became an essential character of Roman culture. However, Christianity 
fundamentally changed Roman culture because as Gibbon argued, it acted to 
undermine reason. Christianity represented a challenge to reason because religion 
itself relies heavily upon faith. The teachings of Christianity spoke of Jesus healing 
the sick miraculously, making the crippled walk and the blind see, and said that Jesus 
himselfrose from the dead. 
In addition, there became less of a concern with the here and now and m9re 
I 
focus on the rewards of heaven in the afterlife. Gibbon argued that Christianity ~cted 
to set back progress. The Romans became pacifists, n~t wanting to go to war wib 
! 
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those that were hostile and posed a threat. He argued that Christianity sapped the 
fighting spirit out of Rome. Furthermore, fraud, envy, malice, abuse of power, !ind 
I 
' corruption became rampant in the church, just as it was in the Roman senate (Gibbon 
I 
1998, 338). Christianity became a powerful force in Rome and Constantine became 
' 
the first Christian Roman Emperor in 306. Gibbon argued that Christianity, the 
religion of peace, would come to be the religion of war, massacre, and-corruptioh. 
While Rome became more and more weak, the Persians gained strength and 
were able to take back some of their land (Gibbon 1998, 487). The empire was:being 
invaded by the Goths, and there no longer existed a heavily armed Roman infantry to 
withstand the barbarian cavalry. Rome lost several wars and was invaded several 
times as the empire crumbled. The Western Roman Empire met its end in 476; the 
Eastern Roman empire met its end in 1453. Rome was dealt a major blow from .the 
Persian invasions of the east in the 4th century, immediately followed by Muslim 
conquests. Much of the rest of the western provinces were conquered by waves of 
Germanic invasions. 
Although Gibbon argued that Christianity played a major role in Rome's. 
decline, he also blamed the decline on the loss of civic virtue among Roman citizens. 
Because Roman rule had expanded to the vast reaches of the world, it relied on 
barbarian mercenaries to defend the Empire. These barbarians did not embrace 
Roman culture and eventually turned against Rome. Citizens, like rulers, lost th\lir 
virtue, as well as their sense of identity, tradition, and culture. The prosperity o~ 
! 
Rome also led to its decline. Citizens became weak, materialistic, and self-interested. 
' ! 
67 
Justice, wisdom, and virtue all seemed to fade away. Emperors and senators livrd 
extravagant lifestyles and indulged in all of their inner desires as their people 
' 
suffered. Furthermore, their example provided a model for the masses without 4 
strong countervailing constraint. 
' 
' 
Like Rome, the West's philosophical spirit has been largely evaporated,'as 
exemplified by the West's embrace of value relativism and its overall rejection of the 
possibility of objective moral truth. In addition, like Rome, the West has experienced 
a decline in morality. In the West, there has been an increase in antisocial behavior 
including crime, drug use, and violence (Huntington 2003, 303). There has alsq been 
family decay a~ illustrated by increased rates of divorce, ill~gitimacy, teenage 
pregnancy, and single parent families. Decline in social capital is also obvious as 
membership in voluntary associations have decreased. There has also been a geµeral 
weakening of work ethic and a decreasing commitment to learning and intellectual 
activity manifested in the United States by lower levels of scholastic achievement. 
Corruption and scandals in government appear to be routine. Things that were once 
considered to be immoral are now being tolerated, accepted, and protected by law. 
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Conclusion 
The West was once a place that believed in the possibility of discovering and 
I 
living by universally true principles. The classical political philosophers of ancient 
' 
Greece sought to answer the fundamental questions of mankind. Plato and Aristotle 
' 
philosophized about how people should live, what the good life is, and what virtue is. 
They made judgments about right and wrong and good and bad. However, modem 
political philosophy has transformed into something fundamentally different. Instead 
of looking to what human beings ought to be, how we should live, and what jus.tice is, 
modem intellectuals have for the most part rejected the possibility of objective moral 
truth and disregard these fundamental questions altogether. For them, such questions 
are meaningless because they believe no truth can be gained from such inquiry. 
Specifically, modem thinkers argue that these things are purely subjective value 
judgments and relative to a person, a culture, or history. Furthermore, as has been 
illustrated, the thought of modem thinkers such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau, Nietzsche, and Heidegger was significantly different from the thought of 
classical philosophers and caused a fundamental change in thinking which prep~ed 
the way for the contemporary embrace of value relativism. Again, classical political 
philosophy remained open to an ongoing examination of the human soul and its 
possibilities, believing that it could lead to authoritative guidance in how to Jive our 
lives. In contrast, the writings of some key modem political philosophers tended to 
close off this investigation by asserting that human nature is simply good or bad jand 
cannot be transformed through education or at least habituation. 
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' 
' 
Again, value relativism holds that there are no universally true answers to the 
great questions of mankind and that there is no natural order to the world that can be 
' 
discovered by human reason to provide a model for human existence. The ideJ that 
there is no good, no evil, no noble, no base, no virtue, no justice, and ultimately, no 
truth about anything that is fundamentally important has led to the decline of Western 
Civilization. The reason why relativism is so destructive is because it robs people of 
any real sense of purpose in life. 
The truth of the matter is that answers to life's fundamental questions are a 
result of inductive reasoning because people make conclusions based on relevant 
evidence and experience. Moral judgments are not merely subjective, unconnected to 
facts, or irrational, but they are important things in which knowledge can be gained. 
On questions of such things as justice, a variety of evidence can be looked at, there 
are certainly patterns that exist, and people can make rational decisions. In addition, 
there are certainly "objective" grounds for rationally preferring virtuous qualities such 
as justice and courage, over qualities such as injustice and cowardice. 
By embracing moral relativism the West has essentially lost its moral strength. 
Because moral truth has been eroding, and judgments of value are now largely 
viewed as being primarily subjective, things that were once strongly opposed because 
they were considered immoral are now being tolerated and accepted. When there is 
no longer a moral standard in which to guide life, people become immoral. 
The wide acceptance of relativism has caused the Western intellectual spirit to 
! 
evaporate as well. The ancient philosophers believed that although extremely 
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difficult, true knowledge of the fundamental questions of mankind could be gained. 
But again, it is not so much knowledge of the absolute standards of right and wrong, 
but rather knowledge of what the fundamental questions are-which ones they fe 
and why they are so important. It is the pursuit of answers to these questions that has 
been part of the essential character of the West. The philosophical debate of the 
fundamental questions has withered, however, and the West for the most part no 
longer believes that a discussion on such matters is meaningful. 
For Socrates, the best way for a human being to live is by using his rational 
soul, using reason, and gaining knowledge of the world. A man ruled by his rational 
I 
soul is most wise and knows how to best live his life. He strives for true knowledge 
and attempts to answer the fundamental questions of mankind. He recognizes that 
virtues are real and unchanging, and understands that these things are meaningful and 
should guide his life. However, as Socrates argued, in every culture, there is an 
inevitable and unavoidable loss of intellectualism. Instead of men using the rational 
part of their souls and seeking knowledge, there is a natural tendency to close their 
minds and seek bodily pleasures. They begin to be ruled by the appetitive part of 
their souls and instead of investigating the fundamental questions of mankind and 
ideas about how one ought to live, they instead focus all their time on figuring out 
how to fulfill their inner desires. Instead of being lovers of wisdom, they become 
lovers of money, power, and pleasure. As has been shown, the loss of intellectu!ll 
I 
activity and the closing of minds is what essentially caused the decline of not on)y 
Socrates' imaginary city, but of the Roman Empire and now of the West as well. 
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In addition to relativism causing moral decay, it has also acted to weal«;n the 
West's cultural identity. The West was once a place that believed in certain values, 
I 
morals, ethics, and principles. These things acted to give the West its identity, 'a 
' ! 
sense of purpose, and guided its people. As the core principles of the West 
degenerate, Westerners no longer know who they are or what they should fight for 
which acts to undermine the preservation of the West. Enemies of the West are not 
confused about who they are or what they believe in. Non-Westerners have a clear 
sense of cultural identity, know what they believe in, are willing to die for what they 
believe in, and are gaining momentum both economically and militarily. 
If Western civilization is going to be saved, it must find a way to restore its 
identity by returning to its core values and beliefs. The negative effects that value 
relativism has caused must be reversed. The biggest threat to Western civilization is 
the West itself. Westerners must wake up and realize what is at stake before it's too 
late. We certainly have the means to do what it takes to preserve and defend Western 
culture and civilization, but the question is, do we have the will? 
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